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INTRODUCTION
In the early morning hours on New Year’s Day 2009, Bay Area
Rapid Transit (BART) Police in Oakland, California, responded to
reports of a fight on one of the city’s trains.1 Twenty-two-year-old
Oscar Grant was one of several men pulled off of the train.2 Grant
offered some initial resistance but was soon detained by police, who
laid him flat on his stomach with his arms behind his back.3 At this
point, the routine police detention took a tragic and unexpected
turn. One of the officers involved in detaining Grant, Johannes
Mehserle, allegedly told another officer on the scene that he was
going to stun Grant with his Taser.4 When Mehserle stood up to
Tase Grant, he instead drew his firearm and fatally shot Grant in
the back.5
The State of California chose to bring criminal charges against
Mehserle, and he was convicted of involuntary manslaughter.6 It is
possible, however, that Grant’s family might have pursued a civil
remedy for violation of Grant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, there is a private cause of action against
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District
of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

1. Demian Bulwa et al., Behind Murder Charge Against Ex-BART Officer, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/01/15/MNJE15A6O2.DTL.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Demian Bulwa, Skeptical Judge Grants Bail to Former BART Cop, S.F. CHRON., Jan.
31, 2009, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/01/30/BABI15KCD5.DTL&type
=adfree. The term “Taser” in this Note refers to any nonlethal weapon that is designed to
deploy “electrical energy sufficient to cause uncontrolled muscle contractions and override an
individual’s voluntary motor responses.” DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE’S USE OF LESS-LETHAL WEAPONS app. I (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/
oig/reports/plus/e0903/final.pdf.
5. Id.
6. Demian Bulwa, Mehserle Convicted of Involuntary Manslaughter, S.F. CHRON., July
9, 2010, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/07/08/BAM21EBDOD.DTL.
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to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and [the] laws.7

Under the language of § 1983, an excessive force claim might have
been brought against Mehserle for his fatal shooting of Grant. In
that case, the question would be whether a police officer who shoots
a suspect, although intending to Tase him, is subject to liability for
excessive force under § 1983.
Although Grant’s shooting is perhaps the most famous example
of police officers confusing their handguns for Tasers, it hardly
marked the first time that officers had employed such unintentional
force. In Henry v. Purnell, the Fourth Circuit considered whether a
police officer who unintentionally drew his firearm instead of his
Taser and shot a fleeing suspect in the elbow was liable under
§ 1983 for using excessive force.8 In Torres v. City of Madera, the
Eastern District of California considered a case, on remand from the
Ninth Circuit, in which a police officer mistakenly drew her firearm
and killed a suspect in the back of her police car.9 In both of these
cases, the courts initially found that the defendant officers did not
violate the Fourth Amendment, and even if they had, they were
entitled to qualified immunity for their actions.10 These cases were
subsequently reviewed, and although the courts denied qualified
immunity, both the Fourth and the Ninth Circuits found that an
issue of fact remained as to whether the officers’ actions were
reasonably mistaken and therefore not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.11

7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
8. Henry v. Purnell (Henry I), 501 F.3d 374, 376, 379 (4th Cir. 2007). The procedural
history of this case is long and ongoing. This Note focuses on the 2007 opinion, because it most
clearly lays out the reasonable mistakes analysis that the Fourth Circuit has chosen to adopt
and because it has been cited in other circuits for the same proposition. See, e.g., Torres v.
City of Madera (Torres I), 655 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1120-23 (E.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d on other
grounds, 648 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2011). The most recent opinion in the case is an en banc
ruling of the Fourth Circuit, which reaffirmed that the proper scope of analysis for
unintentional level of force claims is reasonable mistakes. Henry v. Purnell (Henry III), 652
F.3d 524, 531-33 (4th Cir. 2011).
9. Torres I, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 1116-17.
10. Id. at 1123; Henry I, 501 F.3d at 384.
11. Henry III, 652 F.3d at 527; Torres v. City of Madera (Torres II), 648 F.3d 1119, 112728 (9th Cir. 2011).
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The purpose of this Note is to use these cases to explore the implications of § 1983 excessive force claims when police unambiguously
intend to use a reasonable level of force and instead employ an
unreasonable level of force. Critically, unintentional levels of force
in excessive force claims are new. Although scholarship and jurisprudence exists on reasonable mistakes, existing literature tends to
focus on mistakes officers made about whether the conduct that
they intend to carry out was constitutional or about mistakes of
fact.12 This Note evaluates the outcomes of Henry and Torres to
determine whether they are consistent with the history of § 1983,
the policy ramifications of the excessive force doctrine, and the
qualified immunity doctrine.
Finally, this Note also makes a recommendation as to how unintentional level of force cases should be resolved in the future. This
Note argues that the “reasonable mistake” standard developed in
Henry and Torres provides too much protection to police officers.
The analysis in these cases undermines the objective reasonableness test that governs excessive force cases under the Fourth
Amendment and creates the potential for unintentional uses of force
to become a wider defense to excessive force claims. Therefore, this
Note should not be understood to apply only to Taser/handgun
scenarios but to any situation in which police officers unambiguously intend to use lawful force and instead use unlawful force. This
Note recommends that unintentional level of force claims should be
treated like any other excessive force claim: judged by the objective
conduct, and not the subjective intent, of the officer.
This Note first traces the history of § 1983 and explores its aspirational nature. This Note then traces the framework of a § 1983
analysis, focusing on the substantive Fourth Amendment violation
and the additional qualified immunity analysis. Finally, this Note
concludes by laying out the model analysis.

12. See, e.g., Amber Carvalho, Comment, The Sliding Scale Approach to Protecting
Nonresident Immigrants Against the Use of Excessive Force in Violation of the Fourth
Amendment, 22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 247, 254-55 (2008); Jeff Fabian, Note, Don’t Tase Me
Bro!: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Laws Governing Taser Use by Law Enforcement, 62
FLA. L. REV. 763, 765 (2010).
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I. HISTORY OF § 1983
The awakening of § 1983 in the middle of the twentieth century
represents a transformative moment in American law. Many of the
signature advancements in civil rights that marked the middle of
the century emerged from § 1983 litigation.13 Section 1983 was
awakened from its long, post-Civil War sleep via the Supreme
Court’s decision in Monroe v. Pape.14 The original intent of the
statute, as discussed by the Monroe Court, was to combat lawlessness in the Reconstruction South stemming from the violent actions
of the Ku Klux Klan.15 Section 1983—or § 1 as it was then known16
—was one of the Reconstruction Congress’s attempts to assert the
supremacy of the national government, which had been recently
entrenched by the Fourteenth Amendment.17 Although this parochial intent does not readily lend itself to the expansive role that
§ 1983 has played,18 the Monroe Court saw fit to expand § 1983 to
encompass the principle that “Congress has the power to enforce
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry
a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity,
whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it.”19
Today § 1983 occupies a central position in civil rights jurisprudence, in part because of the failure of its fellow civil rights statutes.
Eugene Gressman, a legal scholar writing before Monroe, characterized this failure: strict judicial construction of the Civil War

13. See Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual
Rights—Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1985) (“Many
of the Supreme Court’s most significant constitutional decisions of the past generation, such
as Brown v. Board of Education and the legislative reapportionment cases, were the product
of suits brought under § 1983.” (footnote omitted)).
14. 365 U.S. 167, 184-85, 187 (1961) (construing “under color of law” broadly enough that
it encompassed state actors, such as police officers, who acted with authority but without
explicit lawful sanction for their actions). Accordingly, § 1983 claims can be maintained even
when state laws also forbid the police conduct. See id. at 172, 187.
15. Id. at 174-75.
16. Id. at 171.
17. Id. (“[Section 1983] was one of the means whereby Congress exercised the power
vested in it by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the provisions of that
Amendment.”).
18. See Blackmun, supra note 13, at 1-2.
19. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171-72.
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Amendments and the civil rights statutes that implemented them
had reduced “[t]he civil rights program of the Reconstruction era ...
to a pitiful handful of statutory provisions, most of which are
burdened by the dead weight of strict construction.”20 Gressman was
concerned that civil rights, which “were conceived of as inherent
ingredients of national citizenship and as such were entitled to
federal protection,”21 had given way to a stifling judicial interpretation that reflected antebellum fears about the federal government.22
Although he lamented the state of civil rights legislation, Gressman
did not view § 1983 as a means of rejuvenating protections for civil
rights.23 This was because, in contrast to other civil rights statutes,
the lack of enforceable federal rights up until the mid-twentieth
century made § 1983 essentially dormant.24
The story of the revival of § 1983, then, is inseparable from the
broader story of the revival of federal protections for civil rights—
what fifty years after Gressman’s article could be called the “Second
Reconstruction.”25 The genius of civil rights statutes such as § 1983
is that because they “provide mechanisms for enforcing constitutional rights, when the Court recognizes a new constitutional right,
or broadens an existing one, the reach of civil rights statutes inevitably also expands.”26 Section 1983 is woven into the fabric of constitutional jurisprudence and “represents the primary vehicle used
by parties to vindicate their constitutional rights against state and
local government officials.”27 This symbiosis between § 1983 and the
wider scheme of fundamental civil rights that developed during the
twentieth century led Justice Blackmun to state that § 1983 stands
20. Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV.
1323, 1357 (1952).
21. Id. at 1336.
22. Id. at 1323 (“Such limited guarantees reflected the early fears of a powerful central
government and the early reliance on the states as the protectors of the individual’s rights
and liberties.”).
23. See id. at 1357-58.
24. See id. at 1355 (“The sole problem here relates to the rights, privileges and immunities
which may be said to be secured by the Constitution and federal laws.”); see also Jack M.
Beermann, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, Fifty Years Later, 34 CONN. L.
REV. 981, 1003, 1015, 1017-18 (2002) (discussing theories as to why § 1983 remained dormant
until Monroe).
25. Beermann, supra note 24, at 981.
26. Id. at 982.
27. Id. at 1002.

2012]

EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIMS

2113

“for the commitment of our society to be governed by law and to
protect the rights of those without power against oppression at the
hands of the powerful.”28 Justice Blackmun is not alone in considering § 1983 a “super statute.”29 This view of § 1983 treats it as an
aspirational statute, one that has a central role to play not only in
protecting civil rights but also, through its symbiosis with the concept of rights in general, in developing the very dialogue of rights.30
Justice Blackmun grew concerned, noting that “recent opinions
of the Supreme Court appear to reflect a growing uneasiness with
the heretofore pronounced breadth of the statute and ... a tendency
to strain otherwise sound doctrines in order to ease the perceived
federalism tensions generated by § 1983 actions.”31 Blackmun’s
concerns about federalism, and his plea for the Court to leave the
balance of decision-making authority between unelected judges and
elected officials to Congress,32 echo Gressman’s historical account of
a Reconstruction-era civil rights program rendered all but meaningless by judicial construction.33
The two cases that will form the basis for this analysis must be
viewed within the context of the direction of § 1983 jurisprudence.
While reviewing the facts and legal issues that confronted the courts
in Henry and Torres, it is important to remember the aspirational
nature of § 1983 and to keep in mind the normative bases for its
guarantee that civil rights violations will be vindicated.
II. HENRY AND TORRES
Excessive force determinations are necessarily factually driven.
As such, the factual circumstances in the two model cases must be
recited. In Henry v. Purnell, the plaintiff attempted to flee from the
28. Blackmun, supra note 13, at 28.
29. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1215,
1226 (2001). Super-statutes “aspire toward changing the common law baseline, and they
actually have that effect over time, which in turn means that they become the object of
evolution and debate among judges as well as legislators.” Id. at 1219.
30. See id.
31. Blackmun, supra note 13, at 2-3.
32. Id. at 23 (“If § 1983 as presently construed does shift political authority from elected
officials to unelected judges ... the remedy, it seems to me, lies with the elected members of
the Senate and House of Representatives and not with the unelected members of the Supreme
Court.”).
33. See Gressman, supra note 20, at 1357.
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police.34 The court recognized, and the plaintiff stipulated, that “the
undisputed evidence in the record established that Purnell’s specific
intent was to stop Henry from fleeing by means of firing a weapon,”
in this case, a Taser.35 This finding by the court was crucial, because
it established that Purnell seized the plaintiff, and therefore, his
claim could be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures.36 When Purnell
reached for his Taser, he instead drew his firearm and shot the
plaintiff in the elbow.37
In Torres v. City of Madera, the Eastern District of California
considered a case that was factually similar to Henry. In Torres, the
police had already apprehended the suspect and placed him in the
back of a police car.38 While in the back of the police car, the suspect
became agitated, kicked at the back of the police car window, and
was difficult to control.39 In response to Torres’ agitation, the defendant officer opened the door to the police car with the intent to
Tase the suspect.40 The door was kicked into her, and when she
attempted to draw her Taser, she instead drew her handgun and
fatally shot the suspect.41 The plaintiff in Torres was more sympathetic in almost every way than his counterpart in Henry: the suspect was already seized and under police control, and instead of
shooting his elbow, the defendant officer in Torres killed the suspect.
What makes Henry and Torres more interesting, however, is the
way that the parties and the courts treated these facts. In Henry,
the plaintiff stipulated to the fact that the defendant officer’s use of
his gun was unintentional.42 The same was true in Torres.43
Although this might seem like a minor wrinkle, it in fact had major
34. 501 F.3d 374, 379 (4th Cir. 2007).
35. Id. at 381-82.
36. Id. See generally Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment applied to a case in which police used a road block to stop a suspect).
37. Henry I, 501 F.3d at 379.
38. Torres I, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1117 (E.D. Cal. 2009). Torres presented a case in which
the seizure was more obvious, making application of the Fourth Amendment even more
certain. See id. at 1120.
39. Id. at 1117.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1118.
42. Henry I, 501 F.3d at 379.
43. Torres I, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
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implications, because the stipulations meant that there were no
disputes as to what actually happened—the sole duty of the court
and the jury was to determine the implications of those facts.
The Fourth Circuit in Henry expressly recognized that it was
dealing with an atypical case.44 Lacking any clear precedent on how
to proceed, the court decided that the appropriate analysis would
be to fall back on the reasonable mistake standard to determine
whether a violation of the Fourth Amendment had occurred.45 The
court analogized the situation in Henry to situations in which
reasonable mistakes were held not to represent violations of the
Fourth Amendment. These included a case in which police officers
held a reasonably mistaken belief about an apartment complex and
searched the wrong premises,46 in which police officers arrested the
wrong person,47 and in which a mistaken, fatal shooting of an innocent person occurred.48 Based on these precedents, the Henry
court decided that its central inquiry should be into whether the
defendant officer’s belief that he was using his Taser was objectively
reasonable.49 Torres adopted the same position.50
In order to assess whether the defendant officer’s mistake was
objectively reasonable, the Henry court adopted the district court’s
five-factor test that considered: (1) the nature of the officer’s
training to prevent such incidents; (2) whether the officer acted in
accordance with that training; (3) whether the officer would have
discovered that he or she was actually holding a gun if the officer
attempted to flick the thumb safety; (4) whether the sense of danger
that the officer was experiencing was heightened, leading to a

44. Henry I, 501 F.3d at 382 (“[T]his case is atypical because Henry’s claim is based on the
fact that Purnell shot him with the Glock, which is not the level of force that Purnell
intended.”).
45. Id. (“[M]istakes made by officers during the course of their duties have been held to
be reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes under a variety of circumstances.”). Both of
the reviewing courts agreed. Henry III, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011); Torres II, 648 F.3d
1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Where an officer’s particular use of of force is based on a mistake
of fact, we ask whether a reasonable officer would have or should have accurately perceived
that fact.”).
46. Henry I, 501 F.3d at 382 (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 80, 88-89 (1987)).
47. Id. (citing Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 799, 805 (1971)).
48. Id. (citing Milstead v. Kibler, 243 F.3d 157, 160-61 (4th Cir. 2001)).
49. Id. at 384.
50. Torres I, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1120 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
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hurried action; (5) whether earlier actions by the plaintiff led the
officer to use undue haste.51
Before engaging in a critique of the Henry and Torres decisions,
it is first necessary to discuss the basis of the standards that informed the courts’ decisions in those cases. These sections evaluate
the decisions in Henry and Torres and discuss how the doctrine
produced these decisions. This Note argues that Henry and Torres
are the product of trends within the excessive force and qualified
immunity doctrine that undermine their purpose and the aspirational nature of § 1983.52 Ultimately, this Note proposes a model
analysis that seeks to resolve this criticism.53
III. EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIMS UNDER § 1983
A. History
Section 1983 protects against “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [the] laws.”54
The statute depends upon the existence of rights in order to operate.
This is the symbiosis between § 1983 and the wider development of
civil rights that Beermann recognized.55 The recognition that
rights sought to be vindicated under § 1983 must derive from the
Constitution or federal law is not merely an academic observation;
the source of rights influences and shapes how they are applied.
For example, that a citizen has a right to be free from excessive
force is obvious, but whether that right stems from the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, or other sources is not as
clear.56 The origin of the right to be free from excessive force has had
a major impact on how that right is vindicated through § 1983.
It is first important to distinguish what type of excessive force is
at issue when a police officer is in the process of arresting a suspect.
51. Henry I, 501 F.3d at 383. The Ninth Circuit explicitly adopted this test. Torres II, 648
F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2011).
52. See infra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
53. See infra Part VI.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
55. See Beermann, supra note 24, at 1002-04.
56. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (noting the widespread belief in
a “generic ‘right’ to be free from excessive force” before establishing that such a right must be
founded in an explicit constitutional provision).
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Excessive force can occur while suspects are being arrested, while
they are awaiting trial, or while they are otherwise being detained
or serving a sentence, with different constitutional standards applicable in each case.57 In an arrest situation, there are two possible
standards: the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
standard and the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard.58
The Fourteenth Amendment standard was articulated in the
Supreme Court’s 1952 decision Rochin v. California.59 In that case,
police inserted a tube into the suspect’s stomach in order to induce
vomiting so that he would be forced to surrender the illegal drugs
that he had swallowed.60 In an effort to remedy what it perceived as
an egregious violation of civil rights, the Court turned to the vague
language of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to garner the tools necessary to correct the constitutional violation.61
To that end, the Court held that “the proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too
energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience.”62
The Second Circuit developed the “shocks the conscience” test
under the Fourteenth Amendment into a broader excessive force
doctrine in Johnson v. Glick.63 In that case, the court articulated a
test for evaluating excessive force under a Fourteenth Amendment

57. Mark S. Bruder, Comment, When Police Use Excessive Force: Choosing a
Constitutional Threshold of Liability in Justice v. Dennis, 62 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 735, 742-43
(1988) (“Determining the proper threshold of liability in excessive force claims under section
1983 has been complicated by the assumption that an individual’s constitutional rights
change at different stages of the arrest process.”).
58. See id. at 742 (noting that the Fourth Amendment, as well as the paired Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, are implicated during an arrest).
59. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
60. Id. at 166.
61. See id. at 168-69. Justice Frankfurter devoted much of his decision in Rochin to
justifying the Court’s reliance on an amorphous standard to correct such an obvious wrong.
See id. at 169-72. Justice Frankfurter even argued that “[i]n dealing not with the machinery
of government but with human rights, the absence of formal exactitude, or want of fixity of
meaning, is not an unusual or even regrettable attribute of constitutional provisions.” Id. at
169.
62. Id. at 172.
63. See Irene Prior Loftus et al., Note, The “Reasonable” Approach to Excessive Force Cases
Under Section 1983, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 136, 145 (1989) (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d
1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).
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substantive due process theory.64 The test directed the trial court to
consider (1) the need for force, (2) the relationship between the need
and the amount of force that was used, (3) the extent of the injury
inflicted, and (4) whether force was applied in a good faith effort to
maintain order or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose
of causing harm.65 This final step injected a degree of subjectivity
into the analysis that, it has been argued, significantly restricts the
ability of plaintiffs to vindicate their civil rights under § 1983,
because an officer can escape liability by claiming “to have acted in
good faith.”66 Much of Justice Frankfurter’s decision in Rochin laid
out a framework through which judges theoretically would have the
flexibility necessary to punish police lawlessness, tempered by
judicial self-discipline.67 Instead, the apex of the “shocks the conscience” doctrine appears to have afforded greater protection for
lawless officers.68
Prior to the Supreme Court’s clarification of the doctrine on
excessive force, a parallel track for evaluating arrest-level excessive
force claims developed under the Fourth Amendment’s protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures.69 The Seventh Circuit
contrasted the Fourth Amendment approach to excessive force
against the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process approach in Lester v. City of Chicago.70 At issue in that case was a jury
instruction to evaluate the defendant officer’s “abuse of official
power that ‘shocks the conscience.’”71
The Seventh Circuit in Lester characterized force used incident to
arrest as a quintessential Fourth Amendment question.72 At its
most basic, an excessive force action under § 1983 claims that the
“right ... to be secure in [the plaintiff’s] person[ ] ... against unrea-

64. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1032-33.
65. Id. at 1033.
66. Bruder, supra note 57, at 748-49.
67. See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 170-71.
68. See Bruder, supra note 57, at 748-49.
69. See Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 711 (7th Cir. 1987) (detailing the Court’s
reliance on Fourth Amendment standards, and not a Fourteenth Amendment analysis, to
evaluate excessive force claims).
70. Id. at 710.
71. Id. at 709.
72. Id. at 710.
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sonable ... seizure[ ]”73 has been violated.74 The Seventh Circuit
dismissed the Supreme Court’s decision in Rochin as essentially a
preincorporation relic, having been decided when the exclusionary
rule did not apply to the states.75 The Lester court also noted that
the Supreme Court had discontinued its development of the
Fourteenth Amendment analysis after Rochin, which left that line
of reasoning to be developed by the circuit courts.76 When the
Supreme Court faced the issue in excessive force cases, it had
turned toward the Fourth Amendment.77
The Lester court’s excessive force standard relied on the broad
statement that “the Fourth Amendment test measures a seizure’s
objective reasonableness under the circumstances.”78 This standard,
which sought to balance the interests of the individual in remaining
free of unreasonable searches and the government’s important
interests in the intrusion,79 incorporates the first two prongs of the
test developed in Johnson v. Glick.80 The critical difference that
the Seventh Circuit noted in Lester was that the Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process “inquiry into motive is incompatible with a Fourth Amendment standard that calls for objective
analysis without regard to [an] officer’s underlying intent or motivation.”81 The Lester court went so far as to craft a formulation of
the Fourth Amendment’s approach that would come to characterize
the modern position: “An objectively unreasonable seizure violates
the Constitution regardless of an officer’s good intent; likewise, an
objectively reasonable seizure does not violate the Constitution
despite the officer’s bad intent.”82
73. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
74. This is the characterization of the Fourth Amendment test developed in Lester. 830
F.2d at 710.
75. Id. at 710-11.
76. See id. at 711.
77. Id. (“Consequently, the Court has not relied on the Rochin ‘shocks the conscience’
standard but has instead applied a Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis in cases that,
like Rochin, involved highly intrusive searches or seizures.”).
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)).
80. See 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973).
81. Lester, 830 F.2d at 712.
82. Id. See also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996) (“We think [previous]
cases foreclose any argument that ... constitutional reasonableness ... depends on the actual
motivations of the individual officers involved.” (emphasis added)).
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When the Supreme Court visited the question of what standard
should govern excessive force cases, the Justices had a choice
between the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process standard or the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard.83 The main difference between the standards centered on the
role played by subjective intent.
B. Graham v. Connor
The Supreme Court settled the question of which standard to
apply to arrest-level excessive force claims in its Graham v. Connor
decision in 1989.84 Although Graham remains the touchstone for
modern excessive force claims, the degree to which it offers meaningful guidance to courts is unclear.85
Shortly after Lester, the Supreme Court took up the case of
Graham, a diabetic who sustained injuries during an investigatory
stop and later arrest.86 The Court used the case as an opportunity
to declare that “[w]here, as here, the excessive force claim arises in
the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is
most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the
Fourth Amendment.”87 The Court in Graham relied on the familiar
Fourth Amendment notion, also discussed in Lester,88 that the
courts’ essential task was to balance the individual’s interest in
remaining free from excessive force against the government’s interests in intruding upon the individual’s right to be secure in his or
her person.89
The Supreme Court went further than Lester in formulating a
standard to evaluate the balance that the Fourth Amendment
attempted to strike. In general, the test was designed to determine
“whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of
the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to

83. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1989).
84. Id. at 394.
85. See Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119,
1129-31 (2008) (describing the Graham roadmap as “woefully inadequate”).
86. Graham, 490 U.S. at 389.
87. Id. at 394.
88. Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 711 (7th Cir. 1987).
89. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
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their underlying intent or motivation.”90 To assist courts, the
Supreme Court identified three broad factors that would help
determine whether under the totality of the circumstances the force
used was objectively reasonable: (1) the severity of the crime; (2) the
immediate threat that the suspect posed to themselves, others, or
the officers; and (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting or
evading arrest.91 Taken together, the fact-intensive Graham factors
recalled what Justice Frankfurter was attempting to achieve in
Rochin. Justice Frankfurter trusted that judges would, in essence,
know excessive force when they saw it and, using their judicial
temperament, would be able to determine the lawfulness of police
actions.92 This is not altogether different from the task that the
Supreme Court laid out in Graham. However, the Court did not go
so far as to tell judges how the Graham factors should be weighed,93
a limitation that “has largely left judges and juries to their intuitions.”94
The critical difference, then, between how the Supreme Court in
Graham treated arrest-level excessive force claims and how those
claims had been treated under a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process framework is the role of subjective intent.95 To
ensure that subjective analysis would remain out of substantive
excessive force claims, the Supreme Court instructed the lower
courts that “[a]n officer’s evil intentions will not make a Fourth
Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force;
nor will an officer’s good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.”96 The Court was emphatic that,
after Graham, the specter of subjective intent should be expunged
from excessive force analysis.

90. Id. at 397.
91. Id. at 396.
92. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1952).
93. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The Court provided the factors that it believed were
relevant but did not suggest which might be the most important or to what degree each must
be established. See id.
94. Harmon, supra note 85, at 1130.
95. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (“[T]he fact remains that the ‘malicious and sadistic’ factor
puts in issue the subjective motivations of the individual officers, which our prior cases make
clear has no bearing on whether a particular seizure is ‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth
Amendment.”).
96. Id.
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For the most part, the Supreme Court’s framework in Graham
has remained undisturbed, though the specifics of the analysis may
have shifted. The Supreme Court’s most recent excessive force case,
Scott v. Harris, reiterates the Court’s commitment to Graham’s
objective reasonableness standard.97 In that case, police were led on
a high-speed chase that ended when a police vehicle rammed the
suspect’s car, driving him off the road and causing significant
injuries.98 The Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment was the
appropriate standard, thereby broadening the concept of “seizure”
to include almost any termination of the freedom of movement,99
and in so doing expanded the types of cases to which a § 1983 excessive force analysis might be applied. Most importantly, however,
the Scott Court rejected the premise that certain types of force,
including deadly force, require a different kind of analysis under
Graham.100 The Court held that a deadly force analysis “was simply
an application of the Fourth Amendment’s ‘reasonableness’ test ...
to the use of a particular type of force in a particular situation.”101
Just as Graham had held that all excessive force claims at the time
of the arrest are to be decided under the Fourth Amendment’s
framework, Scott extended Graham to cover all excessive force
claims.
The effect of Scott on excessive force jurisprudence, however, may
have undermined the ability of § 1983 plaintiffs to achieve redress
for constitutional violations. Even twenty years after Graham, there
is still no “systematic conceptual framework” for what constitutes
excessive force.102 Echoing Justice Frankfurter’s concerns about
unreasonable seizures, legal scholars critical of Scott, such as
Rachel Harmon, argue that lower courts have paid lip service to
Supreme Court precedent and then relied on their intuitions about
each case.103 Harmon further argues that what little structure the
Graham factors provided to excessive force claims was wiped out by
97. 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007).
98. Id. at 374-75.
99. Id. at 381.
100. Id. at 382-83.
101. Id. at 382.
102. Harmon, supra note 85, at 1127.
103. Id. at 1132 (“[T]he lower federal courts have recited Graham as if it were a mantra
and then gone on to try to make sense of the facts of individual cases using intuitions about
what is reasonable for officers to do.”).
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Scott’s reliance on only nebulous concepts of reasonableness.104 She
concludes that the ultimate consequence of the Court’s failure to
provide structure, and its removal of what structure existed from
the “objective reasonableness” test, is to render “§ 1983 an even
more impotent weapon in the battle against excessive force by police
officers.”105
Henry and Torres reflect the worst of the excessive force trends.
The five factors that the Henry court identified106 reflect a reworking
of the Graham standard such that it begins to reflect just the sort
of ad hoc reasoning that the Court had intended to abandon. This
focus threatens to reintroduce elements of subjective intent that
the Court attempted to banish by rejecting the Fourteenth
Amendment’s “shocks the conscience” framework.107 Although the
courts in Henry and Torres frame their language in terms of the
Fourth Amendment test,108 they actually inquire directly into the
subjective intent of the officers by considering the force that they
intended to use as opposed to the force that they actually used.
Harmon explains that the unpredictability and ad hoc nature of
adjudicating excessive force claims was detrimental to plaintiffs
seeking to vindicate their rights under § 1983 because that unpredictability impacts the next step in the analysis of a § 1983 claim.109
Harmon points out that “[u]nder the doctrine of qualified immunity,
officers are not civilly liable under federal civil rights law for using
excessive force unless the unlawfulness of their conduct is apparent
from prior case law.”110 The outcome of the Scott decision makes
§ 1983 even less predictable and therefore more susceptible to qualified immunity defenses.111 The interaction between the excessive
force doctrine and the qualified immunity defense has become toxic,

104. Id. at 1136 (“[T]he Court not only emasculated Garner, but in the same
paragraph—without comment or analysis—implicitly dismissed the factors articulated in
Graham as central to analyzing reasonableness.”).
105. Id. at 1143.
106. Henry I, 501 F.3d 374, 383 (4th Cir. 2007).
107. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).
108. See Henry I, 501 F.3d at 379; Torres I, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
109. Harmon, supra note 85, at 1123.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1140 (“Scott almost surely makes the outcome of lower court decisions about the
reasonableness of police uses of force more difficult to predict.”).
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to the point that Justice Blackmun’s concern that immunities would
restrict the vindication of rights has come to pass.112
IV. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
A. Doctrine
After the expansion of potential government liability for unconstitutional actions in Monroe v. Pape,113 the Supreme Court articulated
a doctrine that would limit the potential scope of that liability in
circumstances in which its imposition would be injurious to public
policy.114 To this end the qualified immunity doctrine was born.
The Supreme Court first recognized qualified immunity as its own
unique defense in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.115 In that case, the defendants, former members of the Nixon administration, asserted that
they were entitled to the same absolute executive immunity that the
President enjoyed.116 The Court recognized that, under the common
law, certain immunities were necessary to ensure that public officials could carry out their vital duties.117 The Court concluded that
the need for this immunity did not stem from any constitutional
principle but was instead a product of public policy that required
that strict enforcement of constitutional principles, under certain
circumstances, should give way to the need of a modern society to
function smoothly.118 Harlow was also motivated in part by the
sentiment, which Justice Blackmun identified,119 that many constitutional claims under § 1983 are frivolous.120
The Court intended the immunity that it crafted in Harlow to be
a departure from the “‘good faith’ immunity” that had characterized
112. See Beermann, supra note 24, at 1014, 1016; Blackmun, supra note 13, at 23-24.
113. 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961).
114. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813 (1982).
115. Id. at 815.
116. Id. at 802, 808.
117. Id. at 806 (“As recognized at common law, public officers require this protection to
shield them from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats
of liability.”).
118. See id. at 813-14.
119. See Blackmun, supra note 13, at 2.
120. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (“[I]t cannot be disputed seriously that claims frequently run
against the innocent as well as the guilty—at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to
society as a whole.”).
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the common law and prior decisions.121 That test had both objective
and subjective elements that an official would have to plead in
order to mount a proper defense.122 In crafting its modern qualified
immunity defense, the Harlow Court rejected the subjective element, which required a finding of malicious intent.123 The Court did
so because the element would prove unduly burdensome on courts
that had to consider intent, a question of fact, in summary judgment
motions.124
In fact, the Court’s project in Harlow was to provide greater
immunity for officials.125 One factor in the Court’s decision, which
would later come to the fore in the Court’s most recent qualified
immunity case, Pearson v. Callahan, was that qualified immunity
is an immunity rather than an affirmative defense, and thus even
going to trial essentially represents a forfeiture of the immunity.126
In order to effectuate its goal, the Court turned toward a standard
that became familiar in the later Graham case: objective reasonableness.127
The objective reasonableness test that the Court formulated in
Harlow stated that “government officials performing discretionary
functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
should have known.”128 The Court ultimately clarified that this
objective reasonableness test includes two prongs. In order to determine whether a defendant officer met the standard for qualified
immunity the Court first asked (1) whether the facts alleged by the
plaintiff make out a constitutional violation and, if so, (2) whether
the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the violation.129 The Court had required in Saucier v. Katz that courts strictly

121. Id. at 814-15.
122. Id. at 815.
123. Id. at 815-18.
124. Id. at 816.
125. Id. at 818-19.
126. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 526 (1985)).
127. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
128. Id.
129. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
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follow this sequence,130 but the central holding of Pearson was that
courts could use their discretion to determine which step to resolve
first.131
In addition to these two prongs, many courts have applied a third
requirement, in the event that the right in question is considered
clearly established.132 This final step requires the court to determine
whether “a reasonable officer would have known that he was
violating this clearly established right.”133 This step, although not
mentioned by the Court in Pearson, is consistent with the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Harlow: “Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct ... by reference to clearly established
law, should avoid excessive disruption of government and permit
the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.”134 It could further be argued that, in addition to these policy
reasons, the additional step is consistent with the Court’s reasoning
in Harlow that the right in question is not judged by whether it is
clearly established to a judge or a legal practitioner but that it is a
statutory or constitutional right “of which a reasonable person
should have known.”135 It follows that, implicit in the “clearly established” line of analysis, is a requirement that a reasonable officer
could be mistaken about the state of the law and, for public policy
reasons, still be entitled to qualified immunity.136
If the defendant officer can show that the right that the plaintiff
is seeking to vindicate is not clearly established, or that a reasonable officer in his or her position would not have known that the
right was clearly established, then he or she may invoke qualified
immunity and be free from suit.137

130.
131.
132.
(1999).
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).
Id. at 236.
Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 MO. L. REV. 123, 141
Id.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (footnote omitted).
Id.
See id. at 818-19.
See id.
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B. Qualified Immunity Critiques
The qualified immunity doctrine has drawn substantial scholarly
criticism. Though some scholars have defended some aspects of the
immunity, it has been broadly criticized, particularly with regard to
those claims that rest on the Fourth Amendment and its reasonableness standard.
1. Criticisms
Qualified immunity has distorted other values in the legal system
and provided perverse incentives to law enforcement officers. First,
as Evan Mandery argues, qualified immunity “departs from the
commonly accepted maxim that all citizens are to be held strictly
liable for knowledge of the law.”138 That is, law enforcement officers
can escape liability by being ignorant of the law. Of course, one
might respond to Mandery’s criticism by pointing to Harlow’s requirement that ignorance is excused only when a reasonable person
would not have known.139
Mandery’s stronger criticism is that because qualified immunity
holds officers to a low standard for their knowledge of the law,140
they have no incentive to learn it and thus provide enforcement
more consistent with the Constitution.141 Mandery argues that this
creates particular problems in the context of excessive force cases,
in which victims of police misconduct are often powerless to mitigate
that conduct because the level of care that victims take to comply
with the law is often irrelevant.142 In response, Mandery suggests
that strict liability might be applied to § 1983 cases, a beneficial
move that would remove uncertainty about which rights the statute
will vindicate and would fully expunge subjective criteria from
138. Evan J. Mandery, Qualified Immunity or Absolute Impunity? The Moral Hazards of
Extending Qualified Immunity to Lower-Level Public Officials, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
479, 481 (1994).
139. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
140. Mandery, supra note 138, at 481.
141. Id. at 481, 513 (noting that by holding officials to an “extremely low standard of care
for knowledge of the law,” qualified immunity creates a “moral hazard [that] leaves public
officials with virtually no incentive to ascertain or comply with the law governing their
conduct”).
142. Id. at 497.
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liability.143 The public policy justifications of qualified immunity144
would, of course, require that strict liability be packaged with a
mandatory indemnification scheme or a respondeat superior theory
of liability for municipalities,145 and Mandery admits that such
packaging has been explicitly rejected by the Court.146
Another criticism leveled at qualified immunity is that, in
general, it widens the gap between rights and their remedies. This
is the argument taken up by John Jeffries, who argues that
“[d]octrines that curtail individual redress thus not only deny full
remediation to some victims; they also call into question the adequacy of the overall structure of constitutional enforcement.”147
Jeffries explains that this gap is particularly wide in § 1983
claims.148 This is not to say that Jeffries disregards the policy
arguments for qualified immunity; his argument is that although
society must tolerate some gaps, it should not come to believe that
such gaps are anything more than a necessary evil whose social
value should be carefully evaluated.149 The chief benefit that Jeffries
identifies in such a gap is that it “facilitates constitutional change
by reducing the costs of innovation.”150 Jeffries is concerned that, if
government had to bear the true cost of constitutional violations,
then courts would be reluctant to develop new rights.151 Jeffries is
careful to point out that his framework views the proper role of
qualified immunity as shielding government actors from liability,
not as an endorsement of current law.152
Diana Hassel is one of the most strident critics of qualified immunity. She argues that qualified immunity is essentially a smoke143. Id. at 495.
144. A primary justification is the necessity of policy officers and other officials to be able
to perform their duties without excessive fear of litigation. See supra text accompanying note
118.
145. Mandery, supra note 138, at 515.
146. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978).
147. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87,
89 (1999). Jeffries’ position here could be considered analogous to the concerns voiced by
Justice Blackmun. See supra text accompanying note 28.
148. Jeffries, supra note 147, at 89.
149. Id. (“Unredressed constitutional violations may have to be tolerated, but they should
not be embraced, approved, or allowed to proliferate.”).
150. Id. at 90.
151. Id. at 105.
152. Id. at 91.
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screen that “obscures the choices that are being made on the
fundamental and divisive issues of what constitutional wrongs
should be compensated.”153 In practice, the veil of qualified immunity allows judges to exercise their policy preferences on a case-bycase basis.154 This system, Hassel argues, leads toward a qualified
immunity doctrine that is both highly uncertain155 and inappropriately focused on government interests156 rather than the violation
of constitutional rights.157
Hassel’s critique suggests that qualified immunity returns civil
rights analysis to the sort of methodology that Justice Frankfurter
advocated in Rochin.158 Judges, using their own sound discretion,
determine what “shocks the conscience” to the point that judicial
intervention is warranted.159 A return to this jurisprudence vests
judges with the power to decide which rights will be vindicated.160
Although judges may already exercise this power, Hassel’s argument is that this method hides the policy choices behind which
rights will be enforced, contributing to an impoverished doctrine.161
2. Excessive Force and the Fourth Amendment
The Court’s decision to employ an “objective reasonableness”
standard in qualified immunity and substantive Fourth Amendment
analyses has created a system that many scholars argue has distorted the application of laws designed to vindicate violations of
constitutional rights. One of the first commentators to notice this
153. Hassel, supra note 132, at 123.
154. Id. at 124 (“The broad qualified immunity standard allows for a determination
concerning liability of the defendant that is very flexible and almost completely subject to the
policy beliefs of the judge making the decision.”).
155. Id. at 134 (“The problem with this method of resolving civil rights disputes is the high
cost in clarity and coherence we pay for using it.”).
156. Id. at 156 (“Qualified immunity makes the essential issue of a civil rights claim the
question of whether it would be too much of an inhibitor of government action to require a
particular defendant to pay damages to the plaintiff.”).
157. Id. at 134 (“Qualified immunity makes the result of each civil rights claim appear to
be based on the particular facts of each case, rather than based on the appropriateness of
providing relief for a violation of the constitutional right in question.”).
158. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1952).
159. Id. at 172.
160. Hassel, supra note 132, at 146 (“Whether qualified immunity is granted or denied
appears to be linked to the type of underlying civil right that is claimed to be violated.”).
161. Id. at 147.
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trend was Michael Fayz, who argued after Graham that “[w]hen the
use of force is unreasonable-in-fact, yet deemed legally reasonable
and immune, substantive constitutional protections have been
sacrificed to the purposes and powers of the Court.”162 This doubling
up of reasonableness standards—the potential for reasonable
unreasonableness—undermines the ability of a plaintiff to vindicate
his or her rights under the Fourth Amendment.
Under the modern doctrine of qualified immunity, the full
analysis of an excessive force claim would proceed as follows. First,
the court would determine whether, under the Fourth Amendment,
the defendant’s actions were objectively reasonable under the
circumstances.163 If the defendant’s actions were not objectively
reasonable, the court would then determine whether the defendant’s
belief that his or her objectively unreasonable action was reasonable
under the circumstances was itself objectively reasonable.164 For
good reason, this scheme has been termed “nonsensical.”165 In effect,
defendants would have two opportunities to prove that their conduct
was objectively reasonable, with the standard of reasonableness
becoming less stringent the second time around.
Understandably, the duplication of “objective reasonableness”
standards has led some courts to consider qualified immunity and
substantive excessive force violations at the same time. In Katz v.
United States, the Ninth Circuit held that because the standards for
determining whether an officer employed excessive force and
whether that officer was entitled to qualified immunity were the
same, it would not make sense to consider them separately.166 Other

162. Michael C. Fayz, Comment, Graham v. Connor: The Supreme Court Clears the Way
for Summary Dismissal of Section 1983 Excessive Force Claims, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1507, 153233 (1990) (footnote omitted).
163. See Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117, 125 (2009).
164. Id. (“[A] court must first determine whether a defendant’s actions are objectively
reasonable. Then, assuming that the actions were not objectively reasonable, the court must
determine whether it was nonetheless objectively reasonable for the defendant to have
believed his actions were objectively reasonable.”).
165. Id.
166. Katz v. United States, 194 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Because of this parity, we
have repeatedly held that ‘the inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified
immunity for the use of excessive force is the same as the inquiry on the merits of the
excessive force claim.’” (quoting Alexander v. County of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1315, 1322 (9th
Cir. 1995))).
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circuits have taken a similar position.167 This approach boasts
significant advantages because it considers whether the conduct
itself was reasonable, and does not ask whether unreasonable conduct was itself reasonable. The Supreme Court, however, overturned the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Pearson v. Callahan and
determined that the two inquiries must be considered separately.168
Keeping the two inquiries separate would protect defendants and
preserve the blanket “objective reasonableness” standard announced
in Harlow.169 The practical effect of the Court’s decision was to
metastasize qualified immunity “into an almost absolute defense to
all but the most outrageous conduct.”170
Some scholars, however, have pointed to legitimate reasons for
keeping the two “objective reasonableness” standards separate.
They argue that the “paradox” of reasonably unreasonable conduct
is deliberately designed into the system for the purpose of protecting
officers.171 Although even scholars critical of the bifurcated analysis
would agree that this is the purpose of the doctrine, their supportive
counterparts would respond that there are some situations in which
it makes sense to excuse objectively unreasonable conduct. For the
most part, such situations revolve around reasonably mistaken
beliefs.172 Lisa Eskow and Kevin Cole argue that Graham should be
read with the possibility of reasonable mistakes in mind, because it
consciously adopted a standard that was “closely aligned, but not
necessarily coextensive,” with the Harlow objective reasonableness
standard for qualified immunity.173
It is not clear which standard is best suited for the excessive force
context. Hassel argues that the problems that the double “objective
reasonableness” standard created are “most acute in excessive force

167. See Hassel, supra note 163, at 125-26.
168. See 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
169. Hassel, supra note 163, at 132.
170. Id. at 118.
171. See Lisa R. Eskow & Kevin W. Cole, The Unqualified Paradoxes of Qualified
Immunity: Reasonably Mistaken Beliefs, Reasonably Unreasonable Conduct, and the Specter
of Subjective Intent that Haunts Objective Legal Reasonableness, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 869, 879
(1998).
172. Id. at 870 (“Harlow’s objective formulation of qualified immunity shielded officials who
in fact committed constitutional violations, provided that an official reasonably, albeit
mistakenly, could have believed the conduct in question was lawful.”).
173. Id. at 887.
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claims.”174 Graham counseled, however, that excessive force is
different than other Fourth Amendment contexts like searches,
because “police officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving.”175 In such situations—such as when a police officer mistakenly believes that the suspect has a gun176—reasonable mistakes
may be more likely, and officers should not be punished for acting
reasonably in accordance with facts that they reasonably believe to
be true. These situations, in which the police have a mistaken view
of the facts and act accordingly, may be the quintessential type of
case in which the police are entitled to qualified immunity.177
In sum, the existence of legitimate reasonable mistakes and valid
policy arguments for protecting police officers who act reasonably
based on them support the bifurcated analysis. However, the
criticism that such an analysis may lead to a level of protection for
police officers which is higher than is necessary must also be
considered. Although there are good reasons for the protections of
the statute to give way when a reasonable mistake is found, the inherent paradox concerning “reasonable unreasonableness” should
caution a broad application of this exception.
V. UNINTENTIONAL LEVELS OF FORCE
The development of the excessive force doctrine has reached a
new stage, in part due to the progress of technology. The excessive
force cases discussed above considered uses of force that could be
assessed under the “objective reasonableness” standard.178 That is,
a court would primarily have to consider the force used and whether
that force was appropriate to the situation given the totality of the
circumstances.179 The court would also have to determine questions

174. Hassel, supra note 163, at 118.
175. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989).
176. See Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 794 (1998).
177. See Eskow & Cole, supra note 171, at 888 (“[T]here may be circumstances under which
an officer mistakenly, but reasonably, could have believed the use of force was reasonable. To
be faithful to Harlow, it is essential to ask the question, and not just assume that a per se
correlation exists in every excessive force case.”).
178. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007).
179. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
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of qualified immunity.180 The courts have not had to consider, however, cases in which the force that the officer intended to use was
not the same as the force that was actually used. This Part considers such uses of force and how they should be analyzed, guided by
the factual scenario of police officers drawing their handguns instead of their Tasers.
A. Reasonable Mistakes
In order to assess whether the defendant officer’s mistake was
objectively reasonable,181 the Henry court adopted the district court’s
five-factor test that examined (1) the nature of the officer’s training
to prevent such incidents; (2) whether the officer acted in accordance
with that training; (3) whether the officer would have discovered
that he or she was actually holding a gun if the officer attempted to
flick the thumb safety; (4) whether the officer was experiencing a
heightened sense of danger, leading to a hurried action; and
(5) whether earlier actions by the plaintiff led the officer to use
undue haste.182 The test conflated the excessive force and qualified
immunity analyses.183
An examination of the precedent that Henry cites for reasonable
mistakes, however, shows that this analysis is not appropriate for
unintentional level of force claims. Those cited cases overwhelmingly relied on what the defendant officer believed about the
situation at hand. In Maryland v. Garrison, for instance, the Court
held that, when considering a defendant officer accused of violating
the Fourth Amendment, “we must judge the constitutionality of
their conduct in light of the information available to them at the
time they acted.”184 In assessing a case concerning the fatal shooting
of an innocent man, the Fourth Circuit in Milstead v. Kibler focused
on the information that was available to the defendant officer at the
time and the degree to which that information suggested that his
180. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009).
181. The entire question presented here is mistake of fact; the mistake of law issue
identified by Eskow and Cole is not applicable in unintentional level of force cases because the
force actually used is clearly unreasonable. See Eskow & Cole, supra note 171, at 875-78.
182. Henry I, 501 F.3d 374, 383 (4th Cir. 2007).
183. See id.
184. 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987).
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mistaken identification was reasonable.185 The Henry test is poorly
designed to capture what the officer knew at the time. Of all the
factors, only the third, which concerns whether the officer would
have known that he was holding his firearm instead of his Taser,
seems directed toward assessing what the officer knew.186 The rest
of the factors, which focus on training and state of mind, speak more
to a general reasonableness standard, not to Garrison’s and
Milstead’s focus on whether the officer was reasonable in misapprehending the facts of the situation.187
Torres II, which admirably attempts to dispel subjective intent in
its analysis,188 also explicitly adopts the Henry factors.189 The Torres
II analysis of reasonable mistakes raises some questions as to the
appropriateness of the Henry test. In assessing the fifth prong, the
court concluded that “a reasonable jury could conclude that [Officer
Noriega’s] own poor judgment and lack of preparedness caused her
to act with undue haste.”190 It is not clear how this analysis helps
determine whether the officer’s mistake was unreasonable. The
cases cited by the Henry and Torres II courts assessed external
factors that would create a mistaken belief in the officer.191 The
plaintiff in Torres II would have been able to challenge a lawful use
of force provided that the officer used poor judgment and was
unprepared. The court’s analysis therefore undermines the “reasonable person” standard by making the subjective qualities and intent
of the officer a relevant factor in determining whether his or her
actions were reasonable.

185. 243 F.3d 157, 164-65 (4th Cir. 2001).
186. See Henry I, 501 F.3d at 383.
187. See Garrison, 480 U.S. at 85; Milstead, 243 F.3d at 164-65.
188. Torres II, 648 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2011) (“That she intended to apply lesser force
is of no consequence to our inquiry, for objective reasonableness must be determined ‘without
regard to [the officer’s] underlying intent or motivation.’” (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 397 (1989))).
189. Id. at 1125.
190. Id. at 1126.
191. See Garrison, 480 U.S. at 88 (in which officers mistakenly entered the wrong
apartment) (“The objective facts available to the officers at the time suggested no distinction
between McWebb's apartment and the third-floor premises.”); Milstead, 243 F.3d at 165 (in
which the officer mistakenly shot the wrong suspect) (“The information that Kibler had at the
time he shot Milstead was that (1) a female had been stabbed, (2) Milstead had been shot in
the neck, (3) the intruder, Ramey, was armed with a gun, (4) Ramey had apparently shot at
Officer Proctor, and (5) Ramey had threatened to kill all of the officers.”).
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The Henry test may find some support in the case of Hill v.
California, in which the defendant officer arrested the wrong
person.192 The Court found that “sufficient probability, not certainty,
is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment
and on the record before us the officers’ mistake was understandable and the arrest a reasonable response to the situation facing
them at the time.”193 The Fourth Circuit adopted that same rationale in Milstead.194 Taken in the most favorable light, the Henry test
could be designed to determine whether the training of the officer
created a sufficient probability that he or she would act reasonably,
and this baseline probability should be adjusted based on the
circumstances that confronted the officer at the time. This interpretation, however, seems stretched. The Hill analysis focused on
whether a reasonable officer in the defendant officer’s position could
have arrived at the same conclusion.195 Again, the Henry factors do
not assist a court in determining whether the totality of the circumstances were such that a reasonable officer could have acted in
the same manner as the defendant officer.196 Rather, they contribute
more toward an analysis of the officer’s training and, ultimately, his
or her state of mind.
Using reasonable mistakes analysis to assess unintentional level
of force claims leads to significant problems. Reasonable mistake
analysis can be analogized to setting a stage. The court’s task is to
take the totality of the circumstances and reconstruct the situation
facing the defendant officer. Then, once the stage is constructed, the
defendant officer is removed and replaced with a reasonable officer.
If the stage is such that the reasonable officer would act in the same
way as the defendant, then the defendant officer’s mistake was
reasonable. This is what the Supreme Court meant in Hill when it
couched its analysis in probability:197 if there is a good chance that
a reasonable officer would have acted the same way, then the defendant officer’s mistake was reasonable, and the Fourth Amendment,
of course, permits reasonable actions. The analysis used in Henry
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

401 U.S. 797, 799 (1971).
Id. at 804.
See Milstead, 243 F.3d at 164.
See Hill, 401 U.S. at 804.
See Henry I, 501 F.3d 374, 383 (4th Cir. 2007).
Hill, 401 U.S. at 804.
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and Torres II turns this process on its head by building an additional piece: the defendant officer’s training and personal preparation for the moment.198 A reasonable officer should not be imbued
with these qualities, as they do not determine, under the totality of
the circumstances, whether his or her action was reasonable.
Rather, they pertain to the officer’s subjective state of mind, and,
though the Torres II court disavowed it, they ultimately look at the
honesty of the action.199
B. Qualified Immunity
The Supreme Court in Pearson v. Callahan mandated that the
substantive prong of a § 1983 violation be considered separately
from the qualified immunity analysis, even if the analyses had overlapping objective reasonableness standards.200 The Henry factors
couch what is essentially a qualified immunity analysis into the
substantive Fourth Amendment claim. The purpose of the Henry
test, consistent with qualified immunity analysis, is to determine
whether a reasonable officer in the defendant officer’s position could
have believed that the action he or she was undertaking was
constitutional.201 By assessing the officer’s training, the Henry
factors place the analysis squarely on the police officer’s preparation, setting the baseline for what a “reasonable officer” should have
known.202 The factors also echo Graham by cautioning that when
assessing reasonableness courts should keep in mind that police

198. Torres II, 648 F.3d 1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2011).
199. Id. at 1127 (“[U]nder Graham, whether the mistake was an honest one is not the
concern, only whether it was a reasonable one.”). The Torres II court may be attempting to
assess a form of gross negligence through its analysis. This is certainly consistent with the
reasonable mistakes doctrine because the analysis does not concern itself with whether the
officer acted with evil intent. At the same time, including as independent factors the
particular qualities of the officer’s mental state—his or her training, preparation, and
judgment—undermines the reasonable officer standard. It also forces jury members to find
the officer’s state of mind as a factual issue, as opposed to assessing whether his or her
conduct was “reasonable” for the situation. This is a grievous wound to the doctrine and
threatens to undermine objective reasonableness in excessive force claims.
200. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
201. See Hassel, supra note 132, at 141.
202. Henry I, 501 F.3d 374, 383 (4th Cir. 2007).
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officers do dangerous work and undertake actions that might, if
viewed with the crystal clarity of hindsight, appear unnecessary.203
Though both the Henry III and Torres II courts ultimately rejected qualified immunity,204 their reliance on reasonable mistakes
analysis allowed them to shift qualified immunity concepts into the
substantive analysis, further eroding the barriers between the
doctrines. The Torres II court implicitly acknowledged the collapse
of the qualified immunity doctrine when it inquired only whether
the law was clearly established at the time of the violation.205 The
Torres II court thus mixed the substantive and “clearly established”
prongs so that the dispositive determination became whether the
defendant officer committed a reasonable mistake.
To illustrate this point, it is useful to consider Judge Siler’s
concurrence in Torres II. Judge Siler served on both the Fourth
Circuit panel that found qualified immunity for the defendant
officer in Henry II, which was reversed en banc, as well as the
Torres II panel that reversed a finding of qualified immunity.206
Judge Siler voted one way in the Henry case and another in Torres
because he believed that the law was sufficiently developed in the
Ninth Circuit to “clearly establish” the right in question.207 The
majority characterized the law in the Ninth Circuit as having
clearly established that “an allegedly unreasonable mistake of
identity resulting in the use of deadly force against a fellow police
officer violated that officer’s Fourth Amendment right.”208 In both
Wilkins v. City of Oakland and Jensen v. City of Oxnard, the Ninth
Circuit held that a reasonable officer would not have believed that
using deadly force against another officer was reasonable.209 Judge
Siler believed that these cases moved beyond the Supreme Court’s
analysis of deadly force in Garner and established a bright line
against the conduct at issue in Torres II.210
203. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989).
204. Henry III, 652 F.3d 524, 534-35 (4th Cir. 2011); Torres II, 648 F.3d at 1129-30.
205. Torres II, 648 F.3d at 1127.
206. Id. at 1130 (Siler, J., concurring).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1128.
209. Wilkins v. City of Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2003); Jensen v. City of
Oxnard, 145 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 1998).
210. Torres II, 648 F.3d at 1130 (Siler, J., concurring). It is not clear why Judge Siler
focused so much on Garner because, as discussed above, Scott has largely displaced that case.
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It is not clear, however, that for qualified immunity purposes
Wilkins and Jensen stand for anything more than Scott’s eventual
holding that the use of deadly force is governed by the totality of the
circumstances test.211 The Ninth Circuit cases fit within the classic
reasonable mistakes analysis, through which a court would assess
whether the mistake of identity was reasonable. The court in Torres
II concluded that a mistake of identity is the same as mistaking a
weapon.212 The Torres II decision, then, collapsed the qualified
immunity and substantive analysis together so that the only
question remaining for a court to address is whether the mistake
was reasonable.
Torres II realized the extent of the doctrine, as identified by
Kathryn Urbonya. Urbonya argued that, in excessive force cases,
the overlap in standards between the substantive analysis and
qualified immunity was ultimately unworkable.213 At the heart of
Urbonya’s argument is the recognition that excessive force claims
are unique by virtue of being the only Fourth Amendment claims
in which objective reasonableness is the sole standard.214
Unintentional levels of force claims go a step further, because they
necessarily implicate a reasonable mistakes analysis, which itself
relies on objective reasonableness. However, unintentional levels of
force are distinct from other mistakes because the reasonableness
being assessed under Henry ultimately refers back to a state of
mind. Thus, collapsing the entire analysis turns the court toward a
forbidden arena: subjective intent.
The Torres II court’s analysis ultimately brings the flaws
identified in a qualified immunity analysis into the substantive
doctrine.215 When directed to consider the Henry factors, the jury
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
211. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383-84 (2007).
212. Torres II, 648 F.3d at 1128.
213. Kathryn R. Urbonya, Problematic Standards of Reasonableness: Qualified Immunity
in Section 1983 Actions for a Police Officer’s Use of Excessive Force, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 61, 107
(1989) (“The standards overlap completely and are not distinct because an officer has qualified
immunity and complies with the fourth amendment if a reasonable officer would have
believed that the officer’s use of force was necessary.”).
214. Id. at 108 (“In contrast to these fourth amendment claims, a single standard of
reasonableness applies in excessive force claims asserted under the fourth amendment.”).
215. In something of an ironic twist, the analysis announced by the Torres II court
preserved the “reasonable unreasonableness” problem identified above. See supra Part IV.B.2.
However, the court shifted the timing of the determination: the analysis allowed an officer’s
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will engage in an analysis that runs afoul of the aspirational nature
of § 1983.216 First and foremost, the Henry approach is a backdoor
for the analysis of the subjective intent of the officer. Graham
thoroughly rejected this approach.217 Although the Henry court did
not state that its standard rose to the level of requiring some sort of
malicious intent, by considering the defendant officer’s intended
force as opposed to the force that he or she actually employed, the
Henry court allowed the subjective intent of the officer to control
the analysis. In doing so, the Henry court ignored Graham’s command that “[a]n officer’s evil intentions will not make a Fourth
Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force;
nor will an officer’s good intentions make an unreasonable use of
force constitutional.”218 The Henry opinion allowed the officer to get
a different, far more lenient standard for evaluating his or her
actions, assuming the officer can allege a good subjective intent in
carrying out his or her actions.
It is important to remember that, in the sorts of unintentional
levels of force cases contemplated by this Note, all of the material
facts have been decided. No factual controversies remain, only the
legal significance to be given to the totality of the circumstances.219
conduct to be found unreasonable at the qualified immunity stage and then reasonable again
by operation of reasonable mistakes.
216. Not only does the analysis contravene the aspirational nature of § 1983, it halts the
development of the doctrine. The ultimate question to be resolved in these cases is
transformed by the reasonable mistakes analysis from a question of law into a question of fact
to be decided by a jury. Juries issue no opinions and leave no law for a future plaintiff to cite
and develop. The analysis, therefore, may retain qualified immunity’s problem of widening
the rights/remedies gap, while at the same time eliminating the value that Jeffries identified:
reducing the costs of developing new constitutional rights. See supra text accompanying notes
147-52.
217. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
218. Id.
219. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 477-79 (4th ed. 2005) (discussing the
circumstances by which the party moving for summary judgment, who also bears the burden
of proof, may prevail on the motion). Karen Blum provides an interesting overview of the
jury’s role in a § 1983 case and how the mistake of fact/law analysis played out in the jury
room. When no material facts about the officer’s conduct remain, juries do not evaluate
mistakes of fact but rather focus on mistakes of law by determining the legal standard that
applies to the defendant officer’s conduct. This is the role of the judge in making the qualified
immunity determination. Karen Blum, Qualified Immunity in the Fourth Amendment: A
Practical Application of § 1983 as It Applies to Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Cases, 21
TOURO L. REV. 571, 591-92 (2005) (“[I]f the jury found that there was, in fact, no knife, that
Stephenson was fleeing, that he was unarmed, and that he didn’t present a danger to the
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By sending the case to the jury, as opposed to resolving it in favor
of the plaintiff, courts abdicate their duty to protect constitutional
rights.220 Courts have not shied away from defining the boundaries
of reasonableness in other Fourth Amendment contexts,221 and
although it would be inappropriate to remove the jury from Fourth
Amendment considerations entirely, sending unintentional level of
force cases to the jury when all relevant facts are known only serves
to impose a faulty standard that protects officers.
VI. MODEL ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, sorting out how courts should deal with
unintentional level of force claims is important because the analysis
is not limited to Tasers. Although this technological innovation may
have accelerated the development of the doctrine, the logic behind
unintentional level of force claims can apply to any use of force the
police employ, so long as the police allege an accident.222 The situation at issue in Torres II reflects an unusual level of incompetence
by the officer.223 Qualified immunity might not have been denied in
cases that did not involve Tasers but rather involved mistaken uses

officer, then there was no reasonable mistake of law because the law clearly states that you
cannot use excessive force when a suspect is unarmed.”).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 163-65. Hassel’s argument is based on the premise
that judges, exercising their own discretion, will vindicate some rights over others and that
they do so in a way that shields policy concerns from public scrutiny. Juries, similarly, do not
issue opinions. Entrusting what is essentially a question of law to the jury—when all the facts
are known and not in dispute by the parties—completely buries these choices.
221. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (defining the bounds of reasonableness
in the context of an automobile search); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (holding that
spot checks were not sufficiently productive to be considered reasonable); Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752 (1969) (holding that searches incident to a lawful arrest are reasonable). The
qualified immunity analysis itself calls on the court to determine whether the officer’s conduct
was reasonable, a determination that is sufficient to keep the case from going to trial. See
supra Part IV.A.
222. See Kanda v. Longo, No. 2:09-cv-00404-EJL, 2010 WL 3000678, at *9 (D. Idaho July
27, 2010).
223. Torres II, 648 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that Officer Noriega’s Glock had
a laser sight on it, her certification training for the weapon had lasted only three hours, the
Taser was holstered on the same side as her firearm, the Taser looked the same as her
firearm, and she had made the mistake drawing her Taser instead of her firearm numerous
times before). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more egregious case.
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in the degree of force or unintended consequences stemming from a
use of force that would otherwise be lawful.224
For the purpose of this model analysis, the substantive violation
of the Fourth Amendment and the first prong of the qualified
immunity analysis—whether a constitutional violation has been
alleged225—will be conflated. This is permissible because a finding
that the substantive right has been violated does not end the
qualified immunity analysis.226 In Graham, the Supreme Court
instructed that courts must determine “whether the officers’ actions
are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
motivation.”227 In a case like Henry or Torres, the officer’s actions
should be assessed without regard to what he or she intended to do
but with regard to what he or she actually did. In these cases, the
officers used their firearms.228 The Supreme Court in Scott v. Harris
rejected the existence of a separate excessive force analysis when
deadly force was used.229 Rather, deadly force was to be considered,
along with every other use of force, on an objective reasonableness
standard.230 Nevertheless, the Court adhered to the holding in
Tennessee v. Garner, which involved an officer shooting a fleeing
suspect in the back of the head.231 The Scott Court concluded that
one possible reasonableness analysis for potentially lethal force
could involve considering “the risk of bodily harm that [the officer’s]
actions posed to [the suspect] in light of the threat to the public that
[the officer] was trying to eliminate.”232
224. A creative defense lawyer could certainly argue that her defendant officer client, when
using a nightstick, intended to hit the plaintiff more lightly than he actually did. This would
be a somewhat extraordinary case, as there would have to be some extenuating circumstances
that would cause the plaintiff to agree. But in such a case, it would be difficult to draw a line
between mistaken choice of weapon and mistaken choice of speed. Though it seems clear that
such a case should be resolved by the force the defendant actually used, a defendant could
argue, based on Torres II and Henry III, that the question of his or her subjective intent in the
level of force he or she intended to use should have a chance to go to the jury.
225. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
226. See id.
227. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
228. See supra Part II.
229. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007).
230. Id.
231. 471 U.S. 1, 21 (1985).
232. Scott, 550 U.S. at 383.
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It is difficult to imagine how potentially lethal force, like discharging a firearm, could be reasonable in either Henry or Torres.
In neither situation did the defendant officer believe that the
suspect was armed.233 In Torres, the defendant officer even admitted
that she did not fear for her safety.234 Perhaps the most damning
consideration of all is that both officers believed that discharging a
Taser, not a firearm, was the appropriate response to the situation
that they faced.235 Because the force that was actually used, not the
force that was intended, is the proper frame of analysis for the
substantive element of an excessive force claim, the defendant
officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they discharged their
firearms at the suspects.
Once a constitutional violation has been found, the inquiry shifts
to the question of qualified immunity, first examining whether the
law in question was “clearly established” at the time of its violation.236 The court may reference Garner and Scott to show that the
use of potentially lethal force can only be justified when the suspect
poses a threat to the public that warrants such force.237 The officers
in both Henry and Torres should have been on notice that their uses
of force were constitutionally impermissible.
The second qualified immunity analysis—whether a reasonable
officer in the defendant officer’s position could have reasonably
believed that his or her conduct was constitutional238—may provide
relief to some defendants. The analysis must be confined to the
actual force that was used in order to be loyal to the Graham
standard. It is difficult to imagine that a reasonable officer could
have believed that discharging a firearm at the suspects in Henry or
Torres was constitutionally permissible. Remaining faithful to the
actual force that was used, rather than relying on an analysis of
mistakes, eliminates the double objective reasonableness problem

233. See Henry I, 501 F.3d 374, 379 (4th Cir. 2007); Torres I, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1116-18
(E.D. Cal. 2009).
234. See Henry I, 501 F.3d at 379; Torres I, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 1116-18.
235. Torres I, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 1117.
236. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
237. Scott, 550 U.S. at 383.
238. See Hassel, supra note 132, at 141.
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identified above.239 In the end, the defendant officers in Henry and
Torres should have been held liable for their conduct.
Some may argue that this approach runs afoul of the public policy
rationale embodied in the qualified immunity doctrine. Mandery
argues that the qualified immunity doctrine aims to calibrate the
optimal level of care that public servants, such as police officers,
take so as to minimize violations of constitutional rights without
compromising the social benefit of a police force.240 One could argue
that the approach articulated here is a form of strict liability for
police officers who make mistakes and that such strict liability
essentially destroys the qualified immunity doctrine. Unintentional
levels of force, however, are distinct from other mistakes. It would
be difficult, in Henry or in Torres, to conceive of how a higher standard of care could have prevented the officers’ actions. The Henry
factors, two of which focus on training,241 may attempt to reach the
optimal level of care. In doing so, however, the court shifted strict
liability to strict immunity. The aspirational nature of § 1983
requires that, if the courts must choose between either pole, strict
liability best protects the constitutional values that underscore the
legal system.
Of course, not every application of this model will result in
liability. Reasonable mistake analysis may be reintroduced to shield
an officer from liability when the unintentional level of force used
is incident to a lawful use of force. That is, a police officer who assesses the situation, and reasonably believes that a procedure to
take down a suspect is warranted, may not be liable if, for instance,
the suspect strikes his or her head on an iron railing during the
takedown.242 Presented with such a scenario, the court may engage
in an analysis of reasonable mistakes to determine whether a
reasonable officer in the defendant’s position could have believed
that there was a very low probability that the lawful procedure
would result in an unlawful application of force. This approach
239. See supra Part IV.B.2.
240. See Mandery, supra note 138, at 492 (“The socially optimal level of care for the official
to exercise is that amount for which the marginal social benefit of acting more cautiously is
equal to the marginal social cost incurred in so adjusting her behavior.”).
241. See Henry I, 501 F.3d 374, 383 (4th Cir. 2007).
242. See, e.g., Kanda v. Longo, No. 2:09-cv-00404-EJL, 2010 WL 3000678, at *1-2 (D. Idaho
July 27, 2010).
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would align unintentional level of force analysis with the “sufficient
probability, not certainty” reasoning in Hill v. California.243 In the
iron railing case described above, the force applied was straightforward and unambiguous, raising no questions of force incident to a
lawful procedure.
CONCLUSION
The recent technological advent of Tasers has created a new
wrinkle in the application of a civil rights statute, § 1983. It has led
to situations in which officers have mistakenly drawn their
handguns instead of their Tasers, sometimes with fatal results.
These unintentional levels of force present a new question for § 1983
jurisprudence.
The evolution of § 1983 has transformed the statute that was once
almost a dead letter into the preeminent vehicle for the vindication
of constitutional rights. Section 1983 has become more than just a
tort statute, and the normative values that underlie it speak to
society’s promise to protect constitutional rights and uphold the
rule of law. To facilitate this end, the Supreme Court has expunged
subjective intent from the excessive force analysis, instead relying
on objective reasonableness to assess a plaintiff’s claims. The vindication of the right to be free from excessive force, however, is
constrained by vagueness in the excessive force doctrine and the
development of the qualified immunity standard, which stretches
toward absolute immunity. This concern is heightened in unintentional level of force cases, because the misuse of the reasonable
mistake standard, even in egregious cases in which qualified
immunity has been denied, invites the same errors that qualified
immunity can create. By relying on reasonable mistake analysis,
courts abdicate their role under § 1983 to protect constitutional
rights.
The model approach this Note proposes vindicates the normative
values behind § 1983, keeps subjective intent out of the excessive
force context, and minimally burdens police officers. If courts are
serious about the Graham objective reasonableness standard, they

243. 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971).

2012]

EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIMS

2145

must evaluate the force that was actually used and not rely on the
subjective intent of the officer who used it.
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